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The modern world is experiencing a revolution that has drawn its inhabitants into the Information Age. This is an era in which information systems and concepts are shaping the way that people think, act, and live. By employing Information Age technologies, limits to the speed of basic processes and functions are no longer constrained by time or space.
Furthermore, near real-time communication between organizations is feasible, regardless of their geographic location, through networking (Long, 2000) . Commercial organizations have lead the way in adopting and integrating Information Age concepts and technologies to achieve optimal levels of success and operational performance. Now, the military is seeking to exploit the same technological advances in networking to achieve similar results on the twenty-first century battlefield.
Though a new concept that has only recently been introduced to the joint military community, the Marine Corps is pursuing the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) concept. The NCW concept is a prospective warfighting paradigm that promises to contribute to achieving optimal command and control (C2) on the future battlefield by exploiting information technology. The greatest challenge lies not in leveraging this technology and integrating it with operational capabilities, but in convincing Marines to adopt a new C2 paradigm that may challenge the Marine Corps' current way of thinking. If the Marine Corps seeks to enjoy the potential benefits offered by NCW and achieve success on future battlefields, then Marine leaders must open their minds to understanding, leveraging, and implementing Information Age technology.
Understanding NCW:
What is Network-Centric Warfare?
The principles of network-centric enterprising were first introduced to the military in JV2010 (1996), a joint publication that outlined the characteristics of future warfare. In JV2010, the founders of this enterprise express the belief that principles employed by network-centric enterprises, which allow them to leverage technology to achieve a competitive advantage, can be translated into operational doctrine for future military forces. Consequently, the new conceptual warfighting paradigm, NCW, was born. Now, the term NCW is used to describe the way future forces will be trained, organized, and equipped to fight.
In Alberts, Garstka, and Stein's Network Centric Warfare (1999) , the gospel for this new concept, NCW is described as: …An information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. Therefore, the desired effects achieved by this concept include an escalation in responsiveness due to increased operational tempo, lower risks in execution due to enhanced battlespace awareness, and overall increased combat effectiveness (Alberts et al., 1999) .
Leveraging NCW:
Potential Power, Benefits, and Implications of NCW NCW focuses on the potential benefit of linking command, control, sensory, and engagement capabilities of all battlefield entities through a digital data network providing a common operational picture that allows these entities to work together to achieve synergistic effects. The source of the increased power of a network-centric organization is derived from the increased real-time information flow between the nodes in the network or battlespace entities (i.e., sensors and shooters), which enables shared battlespace awareness with increased quality. When shared battlespace awareness is exploited by linking C2 and other actor entities, it enables cooperative and synchronized force execution (Alberts et al., 1999) , resulting in increased operational tempo. The potential power of a NCW force will be found in its tightly coupled network of battlespace decision makers. Therein lies the impending problem with melding NCW with Marine Corps doctrine, for the idea of a "tightly-coupled" network may alarm leaders at the tactical decision making level.
Many skeptics of NCW believe that linking all battlefield entities is a method of pooling and controlling decisions at one central decision-node, which will cause NCW implementation to result in greater centralized control (FitzSimmonds, 1998) . On the contrary, the true power of NCW is derived from the ability to empower all entities in the battlespace as decentralized decision makers (Alberts et al., 1999; Cebrowski, 1997; FitzSimmonds, 1998) . In a NCW environment, once warfighters are riddled by the chaotic effects of war (fog, friction, complexity, uncertainty, etc.), the prudent senior decision maker will becoming more inclined to use the network for its intended purpose to achieve and maintain high operational tempo; by pushing down decisions to key decision makers at lower echelons. Indeed, the principal objective of NCW is the empowerment of all battlefield entities to decide and act simultaneously in order to mass effects, achieve shock and awe, and bring about a rapid conclusion to the engagement (Alberts et al., 1999; Ullman & Wade, 1996) . 
Challenge and Summary
Yet, NCW is unproven; it is still a concept. It is a future warfighting paradigm framed by organizational, leadership, and technology theory. Network enterprising is a concept proven in the civilian marketplace with great success.
Nevertheless, in order to remain an elite military fighting force for a global superpower in the emerging Information Era, the Marine Corps must embrace NCW to maintain its status of warfighting superiority. Helping NCW materialize from an idea to a valid operational doctrine will require substantial changes in the Marine Corps' way of thinking. The culture, C2 structure, concepts of operation, and organizational forms within the Marine Corps will need to be revisited.
NCW is not a technology-laden Maneuver Warfare; it is its own separate and distinct warfighting model. To reach its fullest potential, NCW will need to be deeply rooted into the Marine Corps' operational art, meaning that new technologies cannot simply be applied to current equipment, doctrine, tactics, and organizations of warfare. There will need to be a co-evolution of organization, doctrine, and technology in the warfighting "ecosystem" to ensure its success. This will lead to the emergence of new tactics, techniques, and procedures to conduct network-centric operations (Alberts et al., 1999) . 
